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IMES

MEMORANDUM THRU IMCOM Directorate – Europe, IMEU-Sembach Kaserne, Unit 23103 APO AE 09136

FOR Garrison Commander, USAG Wiesbaden, USAG Wiesbaden, APO AE. 09005

SUBJECT: (U) After Action Report for, USAG Wiesbaden Joint Response 2019, conducted on 25-27 June 2019.

1. (U) Enclosed is the After Action Report (AAR) of USAG Wiesbaden Joint Response 2019, conducted on 25-27 June 2019.
2. (U) This AAR contains detailed observations, analysis, and recommendations for sustaining and improving plans, policies, and procedures. You are required to provide a Corrective Action Plan (CAP) to HQ IMCOM Provost Marshal/Protection Division NLT 60 days after receipt of this report. We welcome any feedback your staff may have from the written AAR in order to help improve the team's process. This exercise qualifies as your installation's evaluated Bi-annual full scale exercise.
3. (U) The point of contact for this action is Mr. Joseph Osborn, Commercial (210) 466-0986, DSN 450-0986, email joseph.r.osborn.civ@mail.mil.

Encl
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**USAG Wiesbaden
Operation Joint Response
Full Scale Exercise
25-27 June 2019**

AFTER ACTION REPORT



This After-Action Report (AAR) aligns exercise objectives with National and Army preparedness doctrine to include the National Preparedness Goal and related guidance. Exercise information required for preparedness reporting and trend analysis is included.

ADMINISTRATIVE HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

1. The title of this document is USAG Wiesbaden Operational Joint Response FY19 Full-Scale Exercise After Action Report (AAR).
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

USAG Wiesbaden conducted a Full Scale Exercise (FSE) on 25-27 JUN 19 named Operation Joint Response FY19. This exercise was designed to set conditions for the Installation to demonstrate select core capabilities to prevent, protect, mitigate, respond, and recover (P2MR2) from a severe weather incident in accordance with doctrine, local plans, policies, and procedures. The central framework that supports P2MR2 directly correlates to containing the incident, shortening its duration, and speeding mission recovery. The scenario and supporting exercise design triggered the start of the exercise with a weather report, warning the community of approaching severe weather conditions. The Garrison Commander (GC) assembled the Threat Working Group (TWG) and directed them to discuss what precautionary measures the installation might take to mitigate damage to the Installation and reduce risk to the population. The TWG had good attendance and conducted an effective session, however three key staff sections were not present – DPW, DFMWR and LRC. Once complete, the GC directed the Crisis Action Team (CAT), which consisted of all the staff primaries from the Garrison Directorates, to assemble in his office and review the TWG recommendations. Results of the CAT meeting were to delay arrival of all non-essential personnel for the next day until 1000 and close non-essential services. This concluded Day 1 actions.

Day 2 began with another weather advisory, reporting that a severe weather system was within 5 NM of the Installation with sustained winds of over 45 knots. Once again, the GC assembled the CAT and results were to further delay reporting of all non-essential personnel until 1300. At 0802, a microburst struck the Hainerberg Kaserne, resulting in three buildings being damaged in the housing area and a downed aircraft at the Clay Kaserne airfield. At 0805, Directorate of Emergency Services – Fire Department (DES-FD) dispatch received first notification of the damages and the downed aircraft. First responders were evaluated on their ability to successfully complete those tasks associated with each critical link in the IMCOM-PM/P Central Ideas framework, namely: Mitigate Cascading Hazards and Care for the Victims. Initial Law Enforcement (LE) responders at the Hainerberg site established a perimeter and reported information to the EOC. IC was established; however, it only consisted of one patrolman and his notebook. Shortly thereafter, DES-FD responders arrived to begin search and rescue operations, but Unified Command (UC) was never established. DES-FD and DES-LE each ran their own ICPs within 50 feet of each other. Meanwhile, at the airfield crash site, DES-FD arrived on the scene first and established IC, immediately after, fire crews suppressed the fire from the wreckage. DES-LE arrived shortly after, but again, they established their own IC, and UC was never established. Casualties from the airfield incident were properly triaged, treated and evacuated to host nation medical facilities. There were no casualties at the Hainerberg housing site, only 20 displaced residents. The displaced personnel were mistakenly escorted to the designated Safe Haven, rather than the EFAC, which delayed their in-processing and caused confusion with the DFMWR staff. By 1000, immediate response efforts at both sites were complete and both ICs were demobilized. In total, it took approximately one hour to accomplish all critical response tasks. The Emergency Operations Center (EOC) was activated and operational within 40 minutes. Evaluation of the EOC focused on core competencies, to include: maintaining situational awareness, managing information, managing requests for information/assistance (RFI/RFA), and maintaining

historical documentation. Other evaluated areas included fatality management, EFAC and Safe Haven operations, personnel accountability procedures, and recovery planning and operations. The exercise lasted three days (approximately 30 hours), resulting in 0 MAJOR, 16 SIGNIFICANT, 12 MINOR, and 15 SUSTAIN observations with a total of 43 overall. These observations will provide the command team detailed information to determine the extent of achievement of their five training objectives and supports T, P, U assessment.

The exercise was developed to test 18 of 27 core capabilities for USAG Wiesbaden. In addition, one capability (#6 Forensics & Attribution) was observed that was not originally planned to be addressed. The observations associated with this capability have been included in this report to provide Senior Leadership insight and the opportunity to develop a corrective actions plan. The formal planning process began with the Initial Planning Meeting (IPM) in 6 NOV 18, Mid Planning Meeting (MPM) on 4 FEB 19, and Final Planning Meeting (FPM) in 15 MAY 19. Based on the exercise planning team's coordination, the following objectives were developed for USAG Wiesbaden FSE FY19:

Objective #1: Evaluate the installation's ability to manage incident response, gain and maintain situational awareness, maintain control, and support the Incident Commander.

Objective #2: Demonstrate the ability to establish the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) within 2-hours; develop a coordinated response strategy; and sustain response operations.

Objective #3: Provide initial instructions in a clear, understandable, common language and to keep the Installation tenants informed of the situation and provide guidance in a timely manner.

Objective #4: Demonstrate the ability to evacuate damaged structures and coordinate transportation of displaced residents to an established Safe Haven.

Objective #5: Conduct 100% accountability of USAG Wiesbaden personnel via CAT and ADPASS.

Objective #6: Evaluate the installations capability to restore health and social services to the community after an emergency or disaster IAW installation recovery plan.

Training objectives are concise, action oriented statements that describe desired training outcomes. Each training objective aligns to one or more core capability to enable systematic tracking of progress over the course of the exercise or exercise cycles and standardizes exercise data to inform preparedness evaluations. Core capabilities are demonstrated through a series of critical tasks that are outlined in the IMCOM Exercise Evaluation Guides (EEG) and collectively, lead to overall validation of the chosen training objectives. Of the 18 core capabilities chosen for this exercise, 13 were demonstrated and observed. In order for the Command to make an accurate and definitive T, P, U assessment, exercise play must drive the staff and exercise participants to execute critical tasks associated with the core capabilities in order to be validated.

To accomplish that validation, FSEs must have a certain level of rigor, with triggers for specific tasks leading to expected actions of the players. USAG Wiesbaden demonstrated significant live play for the Microburst scenario, including role players as both victims and displaced personnel, an aircraft crash site with fire signature, and a Protection Force that was activated. All six of the training objectives had observations with only one observation falling into the gap category.

In the protection framework, the central ideas that guide planning, training, and performance include P2MR2. In exercising a Microburst scenario, the first responders on scene conducted a size-up, established IC and attempted to manage and direct resources to address the two incident sites. However, instead of forming UCPs at each location, the DES-FD and LE each ran their own ICs. There was no identification of common objectives, no IAP developed, and gaps in overall awareness of concurrent operations degraded the effectiveness of mission continuation and management of multiple resources. The Protection Force (PF) proved to be a capable asset, able to respond within minutes to provide security to the incident scene(s). DES-FD assets suppressed the fire quickly; however, it was noted that without host nation augmentation, the DES-FD's shortages with manpower would severely limit their capability to handle such scenarios on their own.

The EOC was activated in support of the incident and was fully staffed within 40 minutes. First responders passed incident information to their representatives in the EOC; WebEOC boards were populated, and the EOC Director (Chief of Ops and Plans) did a great job driving the EOC staff to address the Commander's priorities and RFIs. The EOC struggled with establishing a battle rhythm and displaying a consistent COP. There should be established priorities and frequency of what is updated and displayed within the EOC COP on available monitors to ensure mutual understanding for all EOC members while conducting EOC operations. The EOC must synthesize raw data into a useable form for the Garrison Commander, to include COAs and recommendations that impact the GC's overall decision making and consequence management.

Accountability was a specific training objective for the installation. The EOC DHR section was very effective in relentlessly pulling data from all the tenant organizations to achieve 100% accountability for the command within just a few hours of EOC activation. They even tried numerous times to utilize the training function in ADPAAS, but the system was inoperable, and rather than waiting on the system to come back online, they immediately turned to manual reporting via WebEOC and were able to achieve 100% five hours after the incident occurred. Later, after proactively troubleshooting, the DHR reps got ADPAAS working and began pushing directorates and tenants to utilize the system.

Restoring health and social services to the community after an emergency or disaster was another identified training objective. The DFMWR effectively established and ran the EFAC, although there are some limitations with phones and internet capacity. The Safe Haven was well coordinated and seemed to be on track to function well; however, the installation never actually operated the Safe Haven. The GC met with the RWG several times throughout the second and third day of the exercise, and the discussions, developed COAs and operational period considerations that were appropriate and actionable.

The purpose of this report is to analyze exercise results, identify strengths to be maintained and built upon, identify potential areas for further improvement, and support development of corrective actions. This after-action report provides an exercise overview to frame exercise observations, analysis of observations in the context of core capabilities and EOC core competencies, and general feedback to support the installation's continued efforts to build preparedness and strengthen resilience.

EXERCISE OVERVIEW

Exercise Name	Operation Joint Response FSE FY19
Exercise Type	Full-scale Exercise (FSE)
Exercise Dates	25-27 June 2019
Scope	This exercise was a three day FSE at USAG Wiesbaden, GE (Clay and Hainerberg Kassernes). Exercise play included all garrison directorates, EOC staff, tenants and limited host-nation participation.
Mission Area(s)	Prevention, Mitigation, Response, and Recovery
Objectives	See Executive Summary
Threat or Hazard	Severe Weather Incident (Microburst), with Aircraft Accident
Scenario	A microburst strikes Hainerberg Kasserne and also affects a fixed-wing aircraft carrying military personnel that crashes on the Clay Kasserne airfield; resulting in 20 displaced persons, 3 fatalities and 10 injured personnel.
Participating Organizations	Players and observers from across installation directorates and tenant organizations as well as local partners participated in USAG Wiesbaden's FY19 FSE. A full list of participants is provided in Appendix A

Core Capabilities

USAG Wiesbaden Operation Joint Response FSE FY19 was designed to examine and validate 18 of 27 core capabilities.

Cap #	COMMON	Eval
1	Planning	
2	Public Information & Warning	
3	Operational Coordination	
PREVENTION		
4	Intelligence & Information Sharing	
5	Screening, Searching & Detection	
6	Forensics & Attribution	
PROTECTION		
7	Access Control & ID Verification	
8	Cybersecurity	
9	Physical Protective Measures	
10	Risk Mitigation for Protection Programs	
MITIGATION		
11	Community Resilience	
12	Risk & Disaster Resilience Assessment	
13	Threat & Hazard Identification	

Cap #	RESPONSE	Eval
14	Critical Transportation	
15	Environmental Resp/Health & Safety	
16	Fatality Management Services	
17	Fire Management & Suppression	
18	Infrastructure Systems	
19	Logistics & Supply Chain Management	
20	Mass Care Services	
21	Mass Search & Rescue Ops	
22	On-scene Security, Protection & LE	
23	Operational Communications	
24	Public Health & Medical Services	
25	Situational Assessment	
RECOVERY		
26	Health & Social Services	
27	Housing	

SECTION 2: CORE CAPABILITIES ANALYSIS

Consistent evaluation criteria described in the table below was applied to each observation discussed in this section.

Table 1: Evaluation Criteria

EVALUATION CRITERIA
MAJOR Improve: Effects mission assurance at a critical point and should be addressed immediately NOTE: observations rated as MAJOR indicate items that impact life safety, mission assurance, or protection of property
SIGNIFICANT Improve: Needs improvement plan in a timely manner with possible mitigation efforts in place
MINOR Improve: Tasks are being met; however, room for improvement exists
SUSTAIN: Indicates actions, procedures, best practices, or innovations that should be sustained

Capability #1: Planning

Capability Summary: Conduct a systematic process engaging the whole community as appropriate in the development of executable strategic, operational, and/or tactical-level approaches to meet defined objectives.

Task 1.0: Maintain battle books for EOC functional areas.

Observation 1.1: MINOR: EOC Battle Books are inconsistently maintained and utilized.

Discussion: Many of the EOC functional sections were using Battle Books; however, others did not have them, or they were outdated and/or incomplete. Of the Battle Books observed, some documents were generic, with no specific data tailored to the AOR in order to be useful in the EOC. Battle Books contain useful tools such as handbooks to help relatively inexperienced EOC personnel complete their assigned tasks and reference checklists for experienced personnel. Battle Books may also serve the purpose of minimizing complexity or opportunity for error in executing a task. They are critical to having access to asset visibility and key tasks associated with the position when activated in the EOC.

References: DA PAM 525-27

Recommendation: Update functional Battle Books and create the missing ones to reflect current operating procedures and requirements specific to EOC functional staff sections. Include templates with USAG Wiesbaden specific information and conduct periodic updates to maintain relevant material to operate in the EOC. Train personnel on use and update them during scheduled training.

Task 2.0: Integrate local, state and federal partners in emergency response efforts.

Observation 2.1: SIGNIFICANT: DES-FD did not have the support of the Host Nation Fire Department (HNFD) in accordance with the published Standing Operating Procedure.

Discussion: The DES-FD has good working relationships with off-post partners, to include agreements in place that have been finalized and coordinated for HNFD mutual aid. The standard HNFD response to an aircraft incident at the airfield consists of seven vehicles and 16-20 firefighters. During the airfield incident involving fire suppression and casualty treatment, there were no HNFD assets participating. Lack of host nation staffing delayed initial patient contact/treatment and transport.

References: AR420-1, DoDI 6055.17, Enclosure 3, DoDI 3020.52, Standard 2, DoDI 6200.03

Recommendation: Include host nation partners in all future training events.

Task 3.0: DES SOP

Observation 3.1: MINOR: DES-LE does not have SOPs that identify required capabilities/support functions in the installation EM plan.

Discussion: First responders respond to a wide variety of emergencies that will require various skill sets from personnel and special instructions for certain types of equipment. SOPs provide the details necessary to execute support response and recovery operations. Plans provide continuity, guidance, and instructions that are specific to various types of emergencies. A lack of thorough plans results in delays in the proper response that could affect life, health, safety, mission assurance, and protection of property.

References: DA PAM 525-27

Recommendation: Establish an SOP that provides predictable outcomes for emergencies by utilizing diagrams and simple instructions. Train and exercise the SOP.

Task 4.0: Ensure all security force personnel are trained and certified.

Observation 4.1: MINOR: Training and certification requirements were not able to be validated for the Protection Force (PF) personnel.

Discussion: PF Bravo Team was activated during the exercise and directed to the Incident Command Post at Clay Kasserne Airfield. PF personnel are required to receive eight hours of specified regulatory training, have current M16/M4 weapons qualifications and must be physically and mentally capable of executing the PF duties. The certification memorandum and training records are to be signed by a field grade officer and maintained by USAG Wiesbaden. USAG Wiesbaden is the final approval authority for all PF team members conducting PF duties and must ensure compliancy checks have been conducted prior to weapons draw by the PF team members. Documents for training and

certification of Bravo Team may exist, however, they were unavailable to the evaluator for confirmation of the training and certification process.

References: USAG Wiesbaden TASKORD 19-037

Recommendation: Maintain current certification rosters and develop procedures to verify personnel identified to perform guard duties have been certified to carry firearms. Maintain strict accounting and conduct periodic checks to verify the accuracy of the rosters.

Capability #2: Public Information and Warning

Capability Summary: Deliver coordinated, prompt, reliable, and actionable information to the whole community through the use of clear, consistent, accessible, and culturally and linguistically appropriate methods to effectively relay information regarding any threat or hazard, as well as the actions being taken and the assistance being made available, as appropriate.

Task 1.0: Ensure all EOC staff are aware of important information and products.

Observation 1.1: MINOR: The PAO did not announce press releases, responses to media inquiries, or comments made and responded to on social media in the EOC.

Discussion: The PAO gathered information to create and publish press releases and other media products. The PAO also responded to numerous media inquiries and was active in responding to questions or dispelling rumors on social media. The Garrison Commander and members of the CAT were briefed in separate meetings outside of the EOC. Individual Directorates, such as DES, DHR, DFMWR and others separately engaged in direct dialog with PAO. However, at no point during the incident was an announcement made in the EOC about important PAO information or what products were produced; especially press releases, which could keep the EOC informed of important media related actions. This resulted in decreased knowledge across functional areas of ongoing PAO activities, which limited situational awareness in the EOC.

References: DA PAM 525-27

Recommendation: PAO make necessary announcements to inform the EOC about significant actions and products. Include this in the EOC SOP, train and validate with drills and exercises.

Task 2.0: Implement communications and warning systems that take into account the population dynamics.

Observation 2.1: SUSTAIN: Public warning system included messaging in German translation.

Discussion: Community warning and update messages sent through the PAO and AtHoc included German translations. Prepared messages in AtHoc were already translated, and the PAO has two certified host nation interpreters for other press releases and products. This allows for the timely dissemination of information to the protected populace, host nation partners, and outside communities.

References: AR 525-27, Ch. 2

Recommendation: SUSTAIN

Task 3.0: Establish a Joint Information Center (JIC).

Observation 3.1: MINOR: The PAO did not establish a Joint Information Center (JIC).

Discussion: A JIC location was identified but not established, missing a training opportunity for both the Garrison and Public Affairs. The PAO did interact with some agencies in the EOC during the incident, but not with other government and NGO media sources. This was a missed opportunity to work together and synchronize messaging about the community and WAAF, standardize processes, and improve interagency cooperation.

References: AR 360-1

Recommendation: Develop MOUs with partner tenant unit PAOs (IMCOM, USAREUR, EUCOM, and USAG Stuttgart) to support future events. Consider integrating local host nation news outlets as permitted. Train and exercise personnel on JIC operations.

Task 4.0: Provide timely updates when pertinent information becomes available.

Observation 4.1: SUSTAIN: The PAO issued effective Installation-wide messaging.

Discussion: PA had pre-planned templates and all disseminated messaging was approved by the Garrison Commander. The first press release, informing the public about the microburst damaging structures on Hainerberg Kaserne and a fatal aircraft crash on Wiesbaden Army Airfield, was prepared, approved and disseminated within the first hour after the incident occurred. Throughout the incident, the PAO team maintained a robust presence on media/social media platforms (SimDeck). Pre-exercise information notifying the community about the FSE was also well executed. The entire PAO staff was fully engaged and mutually supportive of each other's efforts throughout the incident.

References: AR 360-1

Recommendation: SUSTAIN

Capability #3: Operational Coordination

Capability Summary: Establish and maintain a unified and coordinated operational structure and process that appropriately integrates all critical stakeholders and supports the execution of core capabilities.

Task 1.0: Establish shift change cycle during EOC operations.

Observation 1.1: SIGNIFICANT: The EOC did not conduct a shift change throughout the multi-day incident.

Discussion: The EOC was fully staffed throughout the three-day incident. However, they never conducted a shift change, to include a shift change brief. Most of the staff Directorate representatives in the EOC remained the same throughout the entire incident. Although the EOC succeeded in manning the appropriate functional areas, it is questionable if they would be able to sustain manning levels over an extended period of time. Failure to properly manage personnel work/rest cycles could lead to significantly degraded performance over time, jeopardizing mission assurance.

References: DA PAM 527-27

Recommendation: Develop an actionable shift change plan in the EOC SOP. Validate the plan during future training events.

Task 2.0: EOC coordinates resources to support incident response.

Observation 2.1: MINOR: The EOC did not accurately track and manage financial obligations during the incident.

Discussion: The GC directed that the EOC track separate Lines of Accounting (LOAs) for the two incident sites. This directive was never carried out by the RM. Costs for moving families into new quarters, water, food, demolition and new housing were discussed, but there was no tracking of costs in WebEOC. Financial documentation should be provided to the RM by the affected agency (e.g., request for DoD or other federal assistance) to ensure funds are provided in a timely manner. Failure to properly track and manage LOAs could result in overspending, misappropriation of funds, and/or potential legal actions.

References: DA Pam 525-27

Recommendation: Develop a standard process for initiating, updating, and maintaining financial records. Record RM data into WebEOC to ensure historical documentation.

Task 3.0: Maintain historical documentation in the EOC.

Observation 3.1: SUSTAIN: EOC staff representatives consistently used WebEOC to share and store information throughout the incident.

Discussion: Functional areas, such as PAO, DES-LE and DHR consistently used WebEOC boards, chat features and COP briefing tabs to collaborate and document their

actions. This practice ensures that all important information regarding the incident is properly maintained and stored in a standardized system for the command.

References: DA Pam 525-27

Recommendation: SUSTAIN.

Task 4.0: Anticipate, coordinate and provide required resources for the incident.

Observation 4.1: SUSTAIN: DPW and LRC proactively coordinated, validated, and executed critical support requirements during response operations.

Discussion: Upon arrival of trained personnel, DPW shared critical information with the EOC, identified needed resources, and coordinated additional support with their LRC counterpart. This collaboration provided effective support to field operations involving transportation, heavy equipment to support utilities, and support class III requirements.

References: USAG Wiesbaden EOC SOP

Recommendation: SUSTAIN

Task 5.0: Maintain personnel accountability of the EOC staff.

Observation 5.1: MINOR: EOC staff members did not sign-in/out accurately.

Discussion: Once the EOC has been activated, accountability for EOC personnel should occur. For this event, accountability of personnel on duty in the EOC was inconsistent. Many members did not log in or out of the position log in WebEOC, and the sign-in sheet was used only part of the time. Accurate accountability of EOC personnel on duty is important for the EOC Manager to maintain situational awareness and cost tracking in the event of COOP actions.

References: DA PAM 525-27

Recommendation: Train EOC personnel to log into the position log in WebEOC as a standard business practice. Consider reminder sheets on the workstations and utilize analog sign-in sheets as a back-up.

Task 6.0: Establish the EOC/COOP site in an appropriate facility.

Observation 6.1: SIGNIFICANT: The EOC facility is inadequate for the EOC staff when fully activated.

Discussion: The EOC personnel had difficulty throughout the incident maneuvering through the workspace and communicating with each other due to the noise level in the EOC. While designed to accommodate 25–30 personnel at one time, there were times during this incident that more than 50 personnel were required in the EOC. The current facility makes it difficult to conduct sustained operations due to the confined area.

References: DA PAM 525-27

Recommendation: Consider establishing the EOC in a facility as described in DA PAM 525-27.

Task 7.0: Ensure representation of all garrison directorates in the EOC.

Observation 7.1: SIGNIFICANT: Fire & Emergency Services (F&ES) did not have an EOC representative.

Discussion: The EOC was not staffed with a F&ES liaison. An F&ES representative is needed in the EOC to provide the Command with accurate and timely information about the Fire Department's capabilities, situation, and requirements to facilitate the delivery of life saving services. Not having a representative from the Fire Department in the EOC resulted in a lack of communication, inability to account for fire resources, and conflicting information within the EOC.

References: IMCOM-E OPORD 19-024, NFPA 1561

Recommendation: Train and consistently staff the EOC with a F&ES representative during all training and exercises.

Task 8.0: Maintain a Common Operating Picture (COP) in the EOC.

Observation 8.1: SIGNIFICANT: The EOC COP was incomplete and updates to the COP were inconsistent.

Discussion: The EOC utilized WebEOC for their COP, and further, the COP manager made great effort in updating and utilizing the COP at times. However, the COP lacked vital, time-sensitive information that should be displayed at all times in the EOC. For example, the Commander's directed RFIs and 'due outs', as well as the Installation's critical asset status, were never displayed on the COP. Updates for the COP were only presented during preparation for the Commanders Update Brief (CUB), approximately every four hours. The lack of a thorough, consistently displayed COP contributes to a lack of focus on priorities and tasks and may cause delays in critical resources necessary for the preservation of life, health, safety, and property.

References: DA PAM 525-27

Recommendation: Update EOC SOP to include standardized COP format.

Task 9.0: Establish 100% accountability of installation personnel.

Observation 9.1: SUSTAIN: DHR consolidated all unit accountability numbers and achieved 100% accountability despite challenges with the Army Disaster Personnel Accountability Assessment System (ADPAAS).

Discussion: DHR personnel made prior coordination and attempted to utilize the ADPAAS system, but the system was not operational. DHR immediately instituted a manual personnel accountability list through WebEOC. DHR proactively engaged with all Installation units to pull accountability data, and by 1245, they achieved 100% accountability of personnel. At 1300, the ADPAAS system came back online and DHR asked all units to update the ADPAAS system as well. Obtaining 100% accountability of Installation personnel during emergency situations is vital to gaining situational awareness and ensuring the welfare of the populace. Further, ADPAAS represents the Army's official accountability system, and frequent utilization of it during training and exercises increases both the accuracy of the database as well as user familiarity.

References: USAG Wiesbaden Personnel Accountability SOP

Recommendation: SUSTAIN

Task 10.0: Prepare analog products to support contingency operations.

Observation 10.1: SIGNIFICANT: The EOC was unprepared for a cyber-zero/network outage environment.

Discussion: The EOC operated solely on automation (WebEOC) throughout the incident. Even when the Installation S6 advised the EOC of possible connectivity/network issues that were occurring across the installation, the EOC never developed any analog products to back-up their operations. By not producing hardcopy products (such as status boards, maps with overlays, position logs, DA 1594 log, etc.) to facilitate continuity of operations, the EOC was unprepared for a network outage event. Failure to maintain cyber-zero products for a contested environment may result in a loss of situational awareness and delays of critical life, health, and safety resources.

References: OPORD 19-024, Garrison Incident Management System (GIMS)

Recommendation: Create garrison specific cyber-zero products and utilize current ICS forms or other means to document the incident in conjunction with WebbEOC. Incorporate into SOPs and EOC battle books and train EOC staff.

Capability #4: Intelligence and Information Sharing

Capability Summary: Provide timely, accurate, and actionable information resulting from the planning, direction, collection, exploitation, processing, analysis, production, dissemination, evaluation, and feedback of available information concerning physical and cyber threats to the United States.

Task 1.0: Maintain, operate and staff the Threat Working Group (TWG).

Observation 1.1: SUSTAIN: The Host Nation (HN) Polizei participated in the Threat Working Group (TWG).

Discussion: The inclusion of Host Nation Polizei enabled information sharing with DES, Garrison staff members, and tenant units. The information sharing provided for increased situational awareness and the ability for HN to develop appropriate responses for the current situation.

References: AER 525-13, USAREUR OPORD 00500-17, Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA)

Recommendation: SUSTAIN

Task 2.0: Ensure key stakeholders are actively represented in the Threat Working Group (TWG).

Observation 2.1: SIGNIFICANT: Several key staff functions were not represented in the TWG.

Discussion: The EOC sent notification for a TWG prior to the actual weather event. The working group convened and sign-in rosters were utilized for attendance. The current weather watch and potential for increased severe weather were briefed by the 7th Weather Squadron and the follow-on discussion was focused on the second and third order effects should the severe weather materialize. The Garrison S-3/5/7 led and guided the discussion for the group, resulting in recommended courses of action for the Garrison Commander to consider. While the group was interactive and supportive in information development, they lacked some key functional area representation (LRC, DPW, DFMWR) who were designated as required attendees. Questions and confusion arose about upcoming events and how to move resources in anticipation of the inclement weather, which could have been easily answered by the missing Directorates. The lack of participation by key staff sections resulted in incomplete COAs in products put forth for Command decisions. This resulted in the delay of some decisions by the GC due to missing key information regarding activities and assets on the installation.

References: USAG Wiesbaden AT Plan 15-002

Recommendation: Standardize TWG required membership in SOPs.

Task 3.0: Disseminate threat information to all appropriate entities.

Observation 3.1: SUSTAIN: DES-LE disseminated a BOLO report quickly and appropriately to all patrols.

Discussion: DES-LE received information pertaining to an UAV (drone) operating near the airfield. While patrols were saturating the area in an attempt to intercept the drone, the DES-LE representative at the EOC quickly notified the local Polizei and 66th Military Intelligence Office for assistance and follow-up investigations. This fast action and coordination is a good example of safeguarding potential sensitive information and protecting aircraft that could have been damaged by the aerial device.

References: DES SOP

Recommendation: SUSTAIN

Capability #14: Critical Transportation

Capability Summary: Provide transportation (including infrastructure access and accessible transportation services) for response priority objectives, including the evacuation of people and animals, and the delivery of vital response personnel, equipment, and services into the affected areas.

Task 1.0: Coordinate transportation assets to support incident response.

Observation 1.1: SUSTAIN: The LRC coordinated transportation to the emergency Safe Haven for displaced families.

Discussion: The LRC coordinated with both DFMWR and DPW to provide support to families displaced by the severe weather. The LRC provided shuttle service to a new location in approximately one hour, far faster than the four hour standard. The actions of LRC to support the Safe Haven operations ensured that all had access to the facility.

References: LRC EOC SOP

Recommendation: SUSTAIN

Capability #16: Fatality Management Services

Capability Summary: Provide fatality management services, including decedent remains recovery and victim identification, working with local, state, tribal, territorial, insular area, and federal authorities to provide mortuary processes, temporary storage or permanent internment solutions, sharing information with mass care services for the purpose of reunifying family members and caregivers with missing persons/remains, and providing counseling to the bereaved.

Task 1.0: Collect and provide casualty information to appropriate agencies.

Observation 1.1: SIGNIFICANT: The EOC staff submitted an incomplete and inaccurate DA Form 2894 (Designation of Beneficiary Information) to the CAO representative.

Discussion: The DA Form 2894 submitted to the Casualty Affairs Officer (CAO) contained only the last names of two of the deceased personnel and an incorrect name of the third. The complete and accurate information of these personnel was actually on their remains at the incident site. The information could have easily been obtained, and then CAO would only have to validate it prior to beginning the notification process. Instead, the CAO had to wait for the complete information to be obtained on the individuals in order to process the Next of Kin notification spreadsheet. Providing incorrect

and/or incomplete information to the CAO led to delays in notification process, causing undue confusion and uncertainty in the community.

References: WAHC EM SOP

Recommendation: Review SOP's and train and exercise this process to ensure proficiency for all personnel involved.

Task 2.0: Protect restricted and/or sensitive information.

Observation 2.1: SIGNIFICANT: The EOC displayed Personally Identifiable Information (PII) on the COP.

Discussion: The COP displayed in the EOC included last names of decedents before NOK notification was completed. In accordance with AR 638-2, names are to be protected with the casualty report, marked FOUO, and may be exempt from FOIA requests. By placing actual names of casualties and fatalities in WebEOC, the leakage of personal information to unauthorized personnel may occur, contributing unnecessary stress to families, misinformation being disseminated to the public, and potentially causing mistrust in the community.

References: AR 638-8

Recommendation: Standardize WebEOC and COP information and ensure the scrubbing of PII before publishing; conduct training with EOC personnel to ensure understanding of the restrictions.

Capability #17: Fire Management and Suppression

Capability Summary: Provide structural, wildland, and specialized firefighting capabilities to manage and suppress fires of all types, kinds, and complexities while protecting the lives, property, and the environment in the affected area.

Task 1.0: Maintain minimum staffing requirements.

Observation 1.1: SIGNIFICANT: DES-FD is understaffed.

Discussion: Staffing levels of the DES-FD do not meet minimum staffing requirements as per regulations. Inadequate staffing limits on-scene capabilities of firefighting personnel to safely and effectively mitigate a fire emergency. With the current staffing level, the capability of the Wiesbaden DES-FD to deliver minimum core capability is in jeopardy.

References: DoD 6055.06 Table E3.T1; AR 420-1 Chapter 25 Table 25-1

Recommendation: Prioritize hiring firefighters to meet the minimum standard to provide 3 Engine Companies and 1 Incident Commander (13 personnel) on an incident scene.

Capability #20: Mass Care Services

Capability Summary: Provide life-sustaining and human services to the affected population, to include hydration, feeding, sheltering, temporary housing, evacuee support, reunification, and distribution of emergency supplies.

Task 1.0: Maximize training opportunities for mission-related tasks.

Observation 1.1: MINOR: DFMWR did not set up the Safe Haven.

Discussion: Based on the Garrison Commander's guidance, the Safe Haven was established at Wiesbaden High School on Hainerberg Kasserne, rather than the planned SOP location on Clay Kasserne. DFMWR made proactive coordination with DODEA, SLO, LRC and EOC personnel to get the new site opened and ready for set-up. The Safe Haven manager immediately started addressing all Safe Haven requirements and capabilities. Despite the great initiative and effort to establish the new site, the delivery and establishment of cots, linens and other needed supplies never actually occurred. The Safe Haven staff never exercised the process of setting up the facility to assess their capability and level of training. This was a missed training opportunity.

References: USAG Wiesbaden Safe Haven and Mass Care Plan

Recommendation: Leverage drills and exercises to demonstrate Safe Haven capability. Update/Review MOU/MOAs with DODEA for future Safe Haven assistance. Update USAG Wiesbaden Safe Haven guidance and add this new site to the Mass Care Plan. Train personnel and exercise plan.

Task 5.0: Maintain and provide timely situational awareness and response information.

Observation 5.1: MINOR: The LRC logistics support plan for Safe Haven operations lacks details.

Discussion: Functional processes need to be developed in the LRC Emergency SOP in the area of supply (class I thru IX) and services and transportation. During the activation of the Safe Haven, LRC was notified to provide the needed logistics package. This caused confusion within the LRC team as to exactly what the support package should consist of. The type of equipment and class I (subsistence and water) needed for the Safe Haven needs to be detailed in the SOP. Also, the frequency of support and total capacity of the Safe Haven should be outlined within the SOP. Lastly, a step by step process needs to be outlined in the SOP. The lack of these details resulted in some of the LRC staff being unsure of how to properly action resources in support of shelter operations during the incident.

References: LRC Emergency SOP

Recommendation: Update the SOP to include step by step process details. Train on the SOP and validate with drills and exercises.

Capability #22: On Scene Security, Protection, and LE

Capability Summary: Ensure a safe and secure environment through law enforcement and related security and protection operations for people and communities located within affected areas and also for response personnel engaged in lifesaving and life-sustaining operations.

Task 1.0: Establish Incident Command (IC) or Unified Command (UC) at the incident site as appropriate.

Observation 1.1: SIGNIFICANT: Unified Command (UC) was not established IAW NIMS.

Discussion: F&ES established an ICP upon arrival at the Hainerberg Housing incident. Shortly after, the responding LE patrols arrived and established a separate ICP approximately 50 feet from the F&ES ICP. During the entire incident, the two ICPs never established Unified Command. Similarly, at the airfield crash site, DES-FS established IC, but when the MP units arrived, there was never a UC established. The lack of establishing UC at either location caused de-synchronized resource management and information reporting to the EOC from the incident scene. Lack of established clear lines of command, control, and communications resulted in unnecessary risk to responders.

References: DA PAM 525-27, NIMS/ICS

Recommendation: Establish IC/UC IAW NIMS.

Task 2.0: Ensure security of the installation.

Observation 2.1: SUSTAIN: Protection Force (Team Bravo) responded within mandated response time.

Discussion: Protection Force (Team Bravo) is comprised of 12 personnel. This team serves as a type of quick reaction force (QRF) for the installation. They are expected to assemble in totality NLT one hour after activation, and respond to any area of the Installation as directed. The Protection Force was activated during Operation Joint Response and met the reporting time requirements. This capability is valuable to the Garrison leadership, serving as an important security capability which can respond to emergency incidents and augment the permanently staffed security force.

References: TSP 191-AS-2015, ALERRT

Recommendation: SUSTAIN

Task 3.0: Transport affected personnel to EFAC as needed.

Observation 3.1: MINOR: Displaced persons from the Hainerberg housing area were escorted to the wrong DFMWR location.

Discussion: As a result of the microburst, several buildings in the Hainerberg housing area were damaged, resulting in over 20 persons being displaced and needing support

from the Safe Haven. The security force units at the incident scene made the decision to escort (walk) the displaced families directly to the Safe Haven, rather than transport them to the EFAC, as the SOP process prescribes. They then had to be re-directed over to the EFAC for proper in-processing. This resulted in delays of identifying the support requirements for these families, as well as extra requirements for transportation assets.

References: USAG Army Garrison Emergency Family Assistance Plan

Recommendation: Train and exercise this process with all security force or first responder personnel to ensure thorough understanding of the process.

Task 4.0: Conduct emergency service dispatch operations.

Observation 4.1: **SIGNIFICANT**: DES-LE at the MP Desk encountered challenges managing information coming into the communications center.

Discussion: The MP Desk is the center of gravity for LE operations. Once emergency calls for services began to come into the MP Desk, the RTOs and Desk SGT did not have a tracking system in place to organize information or prioritize emergency calls. The Desk SGT could not perform his role as a supervisor because the call taker often needed assistance in executing their duties, which caused the Desk SGT to deviate from his duties in order to process the information. These issues caused a systemic problem where critical information and data were being missed or not recorded IAW doctrine. (i.e. the report of a missing person was not actioned or shared with others)

References: USAG Wiesbaden DES LE SOP

Recommendation: Create a MP Desk Battle Book that can be referenced with easy to read instructions. Verify personnel working the MP Desk have been properly trained; conduct exercises and drills to improve proficiency.

Capability #23: Operational Communications

Capability Summary: Ensure the capacity for timely communications in support of security, situational awareness, and operations by any and all means available, among and between affected communities in the impact area and all response forces.

Task 1.0: Ensure redundant communications are in place to support operations.

Observation 1.1: **SIGNIFICANT**: Radio functionality is insufficient to support the PF.

Discussion: The PF has limited communications capabilities when conducting security missions. Their handheld mobile radios are limited to line-of-site communications and are not interoperable with other first responders. The Soldiers utilized personal cell phones as a replacement for the inadequate equipment. The limited communications capabilities degrade the protection mission and place the Soldiers at increased risk.

References: NIMS/ICS Interoperability

Recommendation: Identify communications equipment, such as Enterprise Land Mobile Radios (ELMR), for use by the team.

Task 2.0: Implement interoperable communication with applicable local, state, and federal officials.

Observation 2.1: SIGNIFICANT: During the airfield crash incident, multiple calls on the APX 6000R Airfield Trunknet went unanswered.

Discussion: Clear and concise communication between the Air Traffic Control Tower and the Incident Commander is required to ensure the safety of responders while operating on tarmac and runways. The F&ES and Airfield Safety state they have a temporary solution for this issue. However, an upgraded system is required to ensure the safety of first responders in future incidents involving the airfield.

References: NFPA 403, DoDI 6055.06

Recommendation: Continue implementation of E-LMR.

Task 3.0: Establish and maintain effective communications between all command and control nodes.

Observation 3.1: SUSTAIN: Communications sent and received between EOC and airfield IC were performed in a clear and concise manner so that all information was completely understood

Discussion: The IC relayed accurate information on the incident scene, to include DIM count and actions on the scene, which painted a clear picture for the EOC leadership. Additionally, the airfield incident site had a live video feed of the site. This combination of communication and visual aid ensured that the Command had good situational awareness of the incident site.

References: DA PAM 525-27

Recommendation: SUSTAIN

Capability #24: Public Health and Social Services

Capability Summary: Provide lifesaving medical treatment via Emergency Medical Services and related operations and avoid additional disease and injury by providing targeted public health, medical, and behavioral health support, and products to all affected populations.

Task 1.0: Conduct casualty tracking and reporting.

Observation 1.1: SUSTAIN: Casualty reporting by WAHC EOC personnel was accurate and timely.

Discussion: The EOC medical representatives accurately tracked patient information throughout the incident. They were able to keep the Command accurately informed of the number and types of patients, the location of the casualties and their health status. They ensured all updates were captured in WebEOC. This enabled the EOC to keep the Command informed with up-to-the-moment information, and enabled the Commander to visit the casualties at the local hospitals.

References: Wiesbaden Army Health Clinic EM SOP

Recommendation: SUSTAIN

Task 2.0: Provide religious support to affected personnel.

Observation 2.1: SUSTAIN: The Garrison Chaplain conducted assessments with affected persons.

Discussion: The Garrison Chaplain arrived at the Hainerberg housing incident shortly after the displaced residents were evacuated from their quarters and escorted to a safe place. He spoke to each person and assured them they would be taken care of to the best of the Command's ability. He listened to their concerns and provided effective counsel to ease their stress. His presence and ability to keep the residents calm contributed to the success of the evacuation process.

References: DA PAM 525-27

Recommendation: SUSTAIN

Task 3.0: Obtain and report casualty/patient information.

Observation 3.1: MINOR: Patient Care Liaison did not provide all available casualty information to facilitate the notification and accountability process.

Discussion: Although more thorough patient information was available at the incident scene, the Patient Care Liaison only provided the EOC with the first and last names of the casualties and the hospital they were evacuated to. Important information such as unit assigned, last four of the SSN, and the next of kin all available, but never obtained. The lack of information collected and forwarded to Casualty Affairs Officer caused considerable delays in the casualty notification mission.

References: WAHC EM SOP, AER 600-8-2

Recommendation: Develop an SOP with checklists for casualty documentation and tracking. Train all personnel on the process and exercise frequently for proficiency.

Capability #25: Situational Assessment

Capability Summary: Provide all decision makers with decision-relevant information regarding the nature and extent of the hazard, any cascading effects, and the status of the response.

Task 1.0: Manage and track RFIs/RFAs

Observation 1.1: SIGNIFICANT: DHR did not respond to assigned RFI/RFAs.

Discussion: The DHR staff was diligent in obtaining personnel accountability, but neglected other areas within WebEOC, such as the RFI/RFA board. For example, the PAO submitted an RFI regarding the deceased persons in order to inform the public but the RFI was not actioned. Due to the lack of casualty information provided to the PAO, this public information was delayed.

References: USAG Wiesbaden EOC SOP

Recommendation: Provide WEBEOC training to all EOC staff on the importance of submitting and responding to RFI/RFA's.

Task 2.0: Establish and maintain a battle rhythm.

Observation 2.1: MINOR: Battle Rhythm is not standardized in the EOC SOP.

Discussion: The EOC was activated at 0816; however, the battle rhythm was not established until well after 1100. Further, the battle rhythm consisted only of a white board in the back of the EOC with information taken from the EOC Director. It was not entered into WebEOC, nor was it taken from the EOC SOP. Establishing a battle rhythm early in an event will ensure all EOC personnel are informed of critical events and deadlines for products, and utilizing a standard template will decrease the possibility of overlooking common actions that should happen during contingency operations (reporting, updates, briefings, etc.).

References: EOC SOP, DA PAM 525-27

Recommendation: Update the EOC SOP with a battle rhythm template and develop a battle rhythm board in WebEOC; utilize both during all EOC training and exercises.

Task 3.0: Perform ongoing capability assessment.

Observation 3.1: SUSTAIN: The EOC continuously evaluated capabilities to meet the needs of the Installation response.

Discussion: The weather scenario drove several complex responses for the EOC to work through. Consistently, the EOC Director and EM monitored the situation to evaluate their capability requirements. Several times, the EOC Director asked the staff if any section needed possible augmentation from surrounding Garrisons (such as Stuttgart). They worked in concert with different sections to develop COAs to generate requirements in

the event of capabilities being exceeded by second and third order effects. Keeping mindful vision of future requirements that may exceed the Garrison's capabilities enables proper planning and coordination so they are not late to need.

References: TM 3-11.42 Multi-Service TTPs for Installation EM

Recommendation: SUSTAIN

Capability #26: Health and Social Services

Capability Summary: Restore and improve health and social services capabilities and networks to promote the resilience, independence, health (including behavioral health), and well-being of the whole community.

Task 1.0: Activate and establish the EFAC.

Observation 1.1: SUSTAIN: The EFAC was activated and established.

Discussion: ACS staff setup the EFAC within one hour of activation. The EFAC staff were well trained and ensured the EFAC was ready to assist with client needs. The EFAC Manager gave an update brief upon return from the EOC update meeting. The staff reacted well to a high volume of phone calls and walk in clients, assisting with all customer needs. The staff even dealt with a client with a concealed weapon, and reacted appropriately with the aid of the on-site MP unit. Effective EFAC operations ensures timely provision of services and support to the affected populace.

References: AR 608-1, USAG Army Garrison Emergency Family Assistance Plan

Recommendation: SUSTAIN

Task 2.0: Establish communications across all customer support nodes.

Observation 2.1: SUSTAIN: DFMWR staff initiated and sustained coordination across the EFAC, Safe Haven and EOC with a variety of communication tools.

Discussion: The EOC used WebEOC and phones to give consistent updates to EFAC and Safe Haven POCs. The EFAC Manager continually monitored WebEOC and made follow-up phone calls to get updated statuses. The Safe Haven Manager continually gave updates to EOC, EFAC and MWR personnel via cell phone, DSN line and face-to-face communication. The coordination and communication tools used ensured that community members and staff were giving out accurate and current information, thus keeping the populace informed and assisting in rumor control for the Command.

References: DA PAM 525-27

Recommendation: SUSTAIN

Task 3.0: Establish communications at the EFAC to support contingency operations.

Observation 3.1: SIGNIFICANT: Communication capabilities are insufficient for DFMWR personnel.

Discussion: Many times in the EFAC, the phone lines were busy with customers trying to call for information. Further, internet accessibility for personnel in-processed into the EFAC was insufficient. During a cyber-zero situation, critical communications between the Safe Haven, EFAC, EOC, emergency responders, and supporting agencies would be cut off. A phone/VOIP outage with no wireless computer capabilities would disable access to critical systems such as WebEOC, OWA Webmail and social media sites. The lack of access to these items could lead to delays in meeting the needs of the affected populace and can degrade or disrupt mission assurance.

References: AR 608-1, DA PAM 525-27

Recommendation: Resource the EFAC with additional phone lines and/or rollover capability. Consider adding communication radios and wireless internet capability to meet the needs of EFAC customers during emergency operations.

SUMMARY OF OBSERVATIONS: TOTAL 43

MAJOR: 0

SIGNIFICANT: 16

MINOR: 12

SUSTAIN: 15

SECTION 3: CONCLUSION

It was obvious there was a significant amount of planning, coordination, and collaboration that went into developing and conducting USAG Wiesbaden three-day All Hazard Full-Scale Exercise designed to validate core capabilities and installation plans/procedures to deliver them in response to a Microburst. USAG Wiesbaden directorates were invested in conducting a quality exercise to provide training and experience for their staff. Leadership, EOC staff, and first responders thought through a series of complex issues associated with this scenario, which led to a quality training event for all.

USAG Wiesbaden should be commended for their efforts to strengthen the installation community's emergency preparedness. Albert Marquez, the lead exercise planner, showed determination, attention to detail, and an overall commitment to a quality exercise. His experience in exercise planning was a key contribution to the overall success of the exercise. Conduct of the aircraft fire, the Press Conference and the numerous CAT sessions demonstrated commitment to improving processes and procedures needed to deliver relevant core capabilities to meet the needs of the affected populace, while also supporting mission assurance and sustaining readiness.

Included in the appendices of this document is an Objective/Capability Matrix. This tool offers a collective snapshot across identified training objectives and target capabilities. Demonstrating defined tasks in an installation's chosen capabilities allows Senior Leaders to determine whether or not exercise training objectives have been met. It is important to remember that not every capability will apply to every training objective; however, those that do must have critical tasks demonstrated, observed, and evaluated. The Evaluation Team does not offer a T-P-U assessment, rather they identify strengths and potential gaps, so leadership can make an informed decision as to their installation's readiness, priorities, and the way ahead.

In the future, focusing on exercise design and maturing training objectives will strengthen exercise design and evaluation contributing to the success of USAG Wiesbaden's emergency preparedness program. IMCOM is committed to providing installations with design team assets that work hand-in-hand with USAG Wiesbaden to develop an exercise to meet Commander's intent, demonstrate the ability of the installation to respond and recover from an incident, and provide valuable insight into how participating programs can build and sustain core capabilities and strengthen installation community resilience.

APPENDIX A: EXERCISE PARTICIPANTS

Participating Organizations	
FSE Crisis Management Team Members	
1.	Garrison Commander: Noah C. Cloud
2.	Deputy Garrison Commander: Edward D. Earle
3.	Garrison CSM: 1SG Lori Soto
4.	Director, Plans, training, Mobilization and Security (DPTMS): Ross C Gordon
5.	Directorate of Human Resources (DHR): Chris A. Pittman
6.	Directorate of Public Works (DPW): Edwin C. Johnson
7.	Director, Directorate of Family, Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (DFMWR): Gregory Holzinger
8.	Logistics Readiness Center (LRC): Kaffenberger W. Heinz
9.	Director, Resource Management (RM): Gregory J. Burke
10.	Network Enterprise Center (NEC): Steven F. Shuford
11.	Public Affairs Officer (PAO): James J. Corbin
12.	DES-Law Enforcement and Fire Department: Edwin H. Escobar
13.	Garrison Safety: Phillip J. Driskill
14.	Religious Services (RSO): Jeffrey D. Dillard
15.	EOC Chief Plans & Ops: Benjamin D. Loney
16.	EOC EM: Alberto J. Marquez
Tenant Organizations	
1.	1-214 AVN
2.	66 TH MI BN
3.	HHBN USAREUR
4.	529 TH MP CO
5.	USACE
6.	AIRFIELD OPS
7.	American Red Cross
8.	USO
Local	
1.	Wiesbaden Fire Department
2.	Wiesbaden Emergency ambulances (two)
State	
1.	N/A
Federal	
1.	Polizei (Host Nation)

- Role Players/Actors: 30
- Observers: 2
- Controllers: 8
- Evaluators: 11

APPENDIX B: USAG Wiesbaden Microburst SUMMARY

The USAG Wiesbaden FSE was a three-day exercise, 25-27 JUN 19. The scenario and supporting exercise design triggered the start of the exercise with a weather report at 1330 on 25 JUN 19, warning the community of approaching severe weather conditions. The Garrison Commander (GC) assembled the Threat Working Group (TWG) at 1430 and provided guidance for them to discuss precautionary measures the installation might take to limit damage to infrastructure and reduce risk to the population. The TWG conducted an effective session; however three key staff sections were not present – DPW, DFMWR and LRC. Immediately following the TWG, the GC directed the Crisis Action Team (CAT), which consisted of all the staff primaries from the Garrison Directorates, to assemble in his office and review the TWG recommendations. Results of the CAT meeting were to delay arrival of all non-essential personnel for the next day until 1000 and cancel certain MWR group activities. At 1726, the EOC sent out an AtHoc message informing the public of the delayed work start times and cancelled MWR activities. This concluded Day 1 actions.

Day 2 began with a weather advisory at 0730, reporting that a severe weather system was within 5 NM of the Installation with sustained winds of over 45 knots. Once again, the GC assembled the CAT and results were to further delay arrival of all non-essential personnel until 1300. At 0802, a microburst struck the Hainerberg Kasserne, resulting in three buildings being damaged in the housing area and a downed aircraft at the Clay Kasserne airfield. At 0805, DES-FD dispatch received first notification of the damages and downed aircraft accident. At the airfield crash site, DES-FD arrived on the scene at 0811 and established IC, while fire crews arrived within minutes and began suppression of a fire at the wreckage site. Casualties from the airfield incident were properly triaged, treated and evacuated to host nation medical facilities. Initial Law Enforcement (LE) responders at the Hainerberg site established a perimeter at 0819 and reported information to the EOC. IC was established at 0828; however, it only consisted of one patrolman and his notebook. Shortly thereafter, DES-FD responders arrived to begin search and rescue operations, but no Unified Command (UC) was established. There were no casualties at the Hainerberg housing site, only 20 displaced residents. The GC directed the activation of the EOC and the EFAC at 0819, and the EOC was fully staffed at 0840. At 0844, the EOC Director provided the first situational brief to the EOC staff regarding casualties: 3-black, 2-red, 2-yellow, and 6-green. At 0900, the GC assembled the CAT in his office and provided guidance and priorities, as well as activation of the Safe Haven. The GC conducted SIR reporting to the SRO IAW applicable policies, to include reporting the fatalities to the Landstuhl AFME reps. The local German coroner removed the three fatalities from the scene at 0944. By 1000 immediate response efforts at both sites were complete and both ICs were demobilized. At 1035, the first customers arrived at the EFAC, approximately 20 personnel. At 1200, the EOC conducted its first CUB with the GC. Immediately following, the GC met with the CAT in his office and issued guidance and updated priorities. At 1530, the GC made the decision to move the displaced families to the on-post lodging facility until available on-post housing could be made to them. At 1740, the EOC conducted another CUB, and the GC directed a PAUSEX.

The exercise resumed on Day 3 with a 0830 CUB given to the GC by the EOC Staff. The GC assembled the CAT in his office immediately following the CUB. At 0945, the RWG (comprised of the CAT) assembled in the GC's office and set priorities for recovery and discussed requirements for future operational periods. At the conclusion of the RWG, the GC directed

closure of the Safe Haven and reduced staffing of the EFAC. At 1100, the GC conducted a telephonic press conference in his office with local reporters. At 1200, the EOC conducted its final CUB, and the GC met with the RWG in his office. At 1315, the GC determined that training objectives had been met and declared ENDEX.

APPENDIX C: EXERCISE EVENTS SUMMARY TABLE

Table C.1: *Exercise Events Summary*

DATE	TIME	SCENARIO / EVENT	EVENT / ACTION
25 JUN 19	1330	STARTEX	Weather inject of severe weather within 10NM of the installation initiates STARTEX
	1433	EOC	TWG is assembled to prepare for severe weather
	1536	GC Office	GC assembles CAT for further discussion
	1726	EOC	AtHoc sent out regarding weather warning
26 JUN 19	0733	GC Office	CAT assembles – GC delays work call until 1300
	0802	Incident Sites	Microburst strikes Hainerberg housing area; aircraft crashes at Clay Kaserne airfield
	0805	Dispatch	Fire dispatch receives first call reference incident
	0811	Airfield	1 st responder (Fire) arrives at the aircraft site
	0814	EOC	EOC receives first call (DES-LE) reference Microburst damage
	0816	EOC	GC orders full activation of the EOC
	0819	Hainerberg Site & EOC	First responder arrives at Hainerberg (LE); GC activates EFAC
	0821	Airfield	IC established at airfield incident site
	0828	Hainerberg Site	IC established at Hainerberg incident site
	0830	Airfield	1st patients evacuated from airfield
	0840	EOC	EOC DES provides first DIM Count (3-dead; 10-injured)
	0844	EOC	EOC fully assembled; Director gives EOC an initial SITREP
	0900	EOC	GC assembles CAT in his office; GC directs activation of Safe Haven
	0914	Hainerberg Site	Hainerberg IC demobilizes; site secured by roving patrols
	0921	EOC	PAO publishes first press release
	0944	Airfield	Deceased casualties at airfield crash site secured by local HN coroners
	1005	Airfield	Airfield IC (Fire) transfers command to airfield safety; IC demobilizes
	1035	EFAC	1st customers arrive at EFAC
	1200	EOC	EOC conducts first CUB
	1330	EOC	RWG held in EOC; GC meets with Directors (CAT) for backbrief immediately after
	1530	Safe Haven	Displaced families transferred into post lodging
	1740	EOC	EOC conducts CUB; then GC announces PAUSEX

27 JUN 19	0800	EOC	EOC resumes exercise with a SITREP led by EOC Director
	0830	EOC	EOC conducts CUB to GC
	0945	GC Office	RWG (CAT) meets in GC's office
	1005	EOC & EFAC	GC directs closure of Safe Haven; EFAC conducts internal hotwash
	1100	GC Office	GC conducts telephonic press conference in his office
	1200	EOC	EOC conducts a CUB
	1300	GC Office	RWG (CAT) meets in GC's office
	1315	GC Office	GC declares ENDEX
	1345	EOC	EOC conducts internal hotwash led by GC

APPENDIX D: EXERCISE DESIGN SUMMARY

To assist USAG Wiesbaden, HQ IMCOM Provost Marshal/Protection Directorate (PM/P) provided a Subject Matter Expert design team to supplement the Installation Project Officer and planning team with both Exercise Design & Control and Modeling & Simulation expertise for planning and executing the FSE.

The design team engaged with the USAG Wiesbaden exercise planning team from October 2018 to June 2019 by providing direct support throughout all FSE planning phases, including the Concept and Objectives (C&O) Brief, Initial Planning Meeting (IPM), Mid Planning Meeting (IPM), Final Planning Meeting (FPM), Master Scenario Events List (MSEL) Conference, and the FSE. Additionally, the design team participated in numerous other IPRs and coordination meetings, ultimately creating a structured exercise scenario that facilitated the garrison's ability to successfully demonstrate response and recovery capabilities and achieve command approved training objectives. Exercise program planning and design highlights included:

In coordination with the IMCOM Lead Evaluator, attend and facilitate the on-site IPM to refine scenario timeline, Master Scenario Event List (MSEL), and HSEEP deliverables; meet with the COP/GIS Manager to confirm simulation linkage/connectivity; conduct a windshield tour of the installation and review exercise locations; and confirm local external partner participation/mutual support. ATS established white cell operations to replicate all internal and external partners that were unable to participate in the FSE in order to provide the necessary realism and rigor to the garrison staff. ATS provided two additional SMEs as well as integrated installation agencies into the white cell which provided real-time interaction and expertise regarding local resources and capabilities. The installation agencies included members from the 2d Signal Brigade and the 405th AFSB.

ATS provided the Nusura Simulation Deck media emulation suite (MES) to simulate public PAO and EOC response actions. Leveraged scenario-tailored video news coverage and closed-network social media platforms to challenge the directorate's ability to de-conflict and synthesize their public information and warning efforts. Nusura also conducted a telephonic press conference with the Garrison Commander as well as the Director for Emergency Services. ATS utilize EDMSIM to replicate "live" play and provide kml link to the EOC for law enforcement, fire, and local community capabilities. Utilized EDMSIM to model/simulate 10 ground medical evacuation operations, and casualty/fatality tracking operations within 3 medical treatment facilities. ATS utilized MSEL Tool by executing 115 MSEL injects that provided collaborative operational results during the FSE and sequential data in support of the AAR.

APPENDIX E: EVALUATOR TEAM ORGANIZATION AND CONTACT INFORMATION

Evaluator	Capability Evaluated	Contact Information
Steven Watts	IMCOM Europe, G-3/5/7	IMCOM OPD-E, Chief, Emergency Services Sembach Kaserne, Germany steven.r.watts2.civ@mail.mil
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Anthony Herrera	DES-LE	Stuttgart, GE
Jeremy Watson	EOC Manager	Rheinland-Pfalz, GE
Gary Hensley	EOC Ops & Plans	Stuttgart, GE
William Reese	PAO	Stuttgart, GE
Robert Rauschenplat	DHR & Medical	Stuttgart, GE
Michael Schack	MWR & EFAC	Rheinland-Pfalz, GE
David Saenz	Logistics	Bavaria, GE
Rita Reilly	ATO	Stuttgart, GE

APPENDIX F: OBJECTIVE/CAPABILITY MATRIX

APPENDIX G: ACRONYMS

Acronym	Meaning
AAR	After Action Report
ACP	Access Control Point
BEMP	Building Emergency Management Plan
CCIR	Commander's Critical Information Requirement
C/E	Controller/Evaluator
COA	Course of Action
COP	Common Operating Picture
COOP	Continuity of Operations Plan
CPAC	Civilian Personnel Advisory Center
CrMT	Crisis Management Team
CUB	Command Update Brief
DACP	Department of the Army Civilian Police
DES	Directorate of Emergency Services
DHR	Directorate of Human Resources
DFMW	Directorate of Morale, Welfare, and Recreation
DGC	Deputy Garrison Commander
DOD	Department of Defense
DPTMS	Directorate of Plans, Training, Mobilization, and Security
DPW	Directorate of Public Works
EAP	Emergency Action Plan
EDRO	Explosive Device Response Operations
EFAC	Emergency Family Assistance Center
EAP	Emergency Action Plan
EMP	Emergency Management Plan
ENDEX	End Exercise
EOC	Emergency Operations Center
EXPLAN	Exercise Plan
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FE	Functional Exercise
FOUO	For Official Use Only
FPM	Final Planning Meeting
FPCON	Force Protection Condition
FSE	Full Scale Exercise
GC	Garrison Commander
GM	Garrison Manager
HSEEP	Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program
IAP	Incident Action Plan
IAW	In Accordance With
IC	Incident Commander
ICS	Incident Command System
ICP	Incident Command Post
IEMP	Installation Emergency Management Plan

Acronym	Meaning
IMCOM	Installation Management Command
IPM	Initial Planning Meeting
IPR	Interim Progress Report
JIC	Joint Information Center
LNO	Liaison Officer
LRC	Logistics Readiness Center
MCU	Mobile Command Unit
MOA	Memorandum of Agreement
MOC	Medical Operations Center
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MPM	Mid Planning Meeting
MSEL	Master Scenario Events List
MWNS	Mass Warning and Notification System
NEC	Network Enterprise Center
NIMS	National Incident Management System
OPORD	Operations Order
PAO	Public Affairs Officer
PAUSEX	Pause in Exercise
POC	Point of Contact
PPE	Personal Protective Equipment
RWG	Recovery Working Group
SAR	Search and Rescue
SC	Senior Commander
SIP	Shelter-in-Place
SIR	Serious Incident Report
SITREP	Situation Report
SFO	Senior Fire Officer
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
STARTEX	Start of Exercise
START	Simple Triage and Rapid Treatment (Triage)
TCL	Target Capabilities List
TTX	Table Top Exercise
TWG	Threat Working Group
UC	Unified Command
WARNO	Warning Order